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December 9, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER, KRAUSE and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 12, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION** 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
These consolidated appeals arise from the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ class-action 
complaints that allege claims arising out of Pennsylvania state foreclosure proceedings. 
The District Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims. We will affirm. 
I. 
The Plaintiffs, David and Kelly Schraven, and Kathleen Todd, defaulted on their 
mortgages. U.S. Bank National Association (the Trustee) commenced foreclosure actions 
against them.1 Each foreclosure complaint asked for damages representing the principal 
balance of the loans, interest, attorney’s fees, expenses incurred in foreclosing, and late 
fees. The Plaintiffs did not defend, so default judgments were entered against them. The 
Trustee’s counsel sought to execute the judgments and the court scheduled sheriff’s sales. 
                                              
 Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, 
assumed senior status on February 1, 2017. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 U.S. Bank serves as trustee to the banks to which the mortgages were assigned. 
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The sheriff’s sales were rescheduled multiple times. Upon motion by the Trustee’s 
counsel, the court reissued the writs of execution to include accrued costs and interest 
through the new prospective dates of sale. The Plaintiffs did not challenge the reissued 
writs of execution in state court. 
The Plaintiffs allege that the Trustee breached its mortgage obligations and 
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),2 by charging post-judgment 
attorney’s fees, and by charging post-judgment interest before the interest accrued.3 The 
District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise de novo review over 
questions of subject matter jurisdiction,” and we have “an independent obligation to 
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”4  
III. 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal district courts from hearing “cases 
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court 
review and rejection of those judgments.”5 Four requirements must be met for the 
                                              
2 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. 
3 The Schravens also bring related Pennsylvania state law claims.  
4 Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
5 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the 
plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment; (3) those judgments 
were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district 
court to review and reject the state judgments.”6  
As a preliminary matter, the Plaintiffs challenge the validity of the underlying 
state court judgments because they were entered by a prothonotary. But Pennsylvania law 
authorizes a “prothonotary, on praecipe of the plaintiff, [to] enter judgment against the 
defendant for failure to file within the required time a pleading to a complaint which 
contains a notice to defend.”7 And a validly entered default judgment can bar federal 
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.8 To the extent Plaintiffs urge that this 
case should be excepted from Rooker-Feldman because the prothonotary exceeded his 
jurisdiction under state law by awarding unliquidated attorney’s fees, their argument also 
fails. While in dictum we have observed that vacating a state court judgment that is void 
as a matter of state law may “not intrude upon the notion of mutual respect in federal-
state interests,” we have not so held, and even the single Ninth Circuit case to which we 
cited for that proposition did not involve an exception to Rooker Feldman, but rather, 
                                              
6 Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (brackets and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
7 Pa. R. Civ. P. 1037(b). 
8 See, e.g., In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
because Knapper could not “prevail on her federal claim without obtaining an order that 
would negate the state courts’ [default] judgments,” the federal claim was barred by 
Rooker-Feldman).  
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rested on the conclusion that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction of the 
matter.9 The exception Plaintiffs propose thus lacks support and would appear to require 
exactly the sort of “review and rejection” of state court judgments that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine was designed to avoid.10  
The first and third requirements are satisfied. The Plaintiffs lost in the state court 
action and the default judgments were entered before they filed their federal claims. 
Central to this appeal are the second and fourth requirements, which are related.  
With respect to the second requirement, the court must “identify those federal suits 
that profess to complain of injury by a third party, but actually complain of injury 
produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left 
unpunished by it.”11 With respect to the fourth element, the court must determine whether 
evaluating the plaintiff’s claims will require “[p]rohibited appellate review consist[ing] of 
a review of the proceedings already conducted by the ‘lower’ tribunal to determine 
whether it reached its result in accordance with the law.”12  
The Plaintiffs argue that their injuries are the result of post-judgment activities—
namely, the inclusion of attorney’s fees and anticipated interest in the reissued writs of 
execution. But the default judgments provided for attorney’s fees and interest through the 
                                              
9 In re James, 940 F.3d 46, 52-53 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Gonzales v. Parks, 830 
F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1987)).  
10 Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.  
11 Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 167. 
12 Id. at 169.  
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date of the sheriff’s sale, and a writ of execution is an enforcement mechanism for a 
default judgment in Pennsylvania.13 The injuries complained of were therefore produced 
by the default judgments, which were neither stricken nor opened at the state court level. 
The Plaintiffs’ federal claims are in effect appeals to the underlying default judgments. 
This is exactly what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine seeks to preclude. Accordingly, the 
District Court correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
IV 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 
                                              
13 See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1262-65 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (discussing Pennsylvania’s judgment procedure).  
